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Anne Maass, Mara Cadinu, Marta Boni and Cristiana Borini 
University of Padua
This paper investigated the hypotheses that (a) inferences from behaviors to traits would occur
more frequently than vice versa, (b) this induction–deduction asymmetry would be facilitated
by stereotype congruence but inhibited by incongruence, and (c) the tendency to draw trait
inferences from stereotype-congruent but not from stereotype-incongruent behaviors would
become more pronounced with increasing levels of Need for Cognitive Closure. Participants
read information about a female or male job applicant that was in part relevant to gender, in
part gender-neutral. The gender-relevant information was either stereotype-congruent or
incongruent. Half of the information was presented as trait-adjectives, half as
behavior-descriptive verbs. A recognition task was constructed so that some of the items (traits
and behaviors) had actually been seen, some were entirely new, and some were new but had
been implied by the information given. All three hypotheses were supported. Implications for
intra-individual and interpersonal stereotype maintenance are discussed.
keywords deduction, false memories, induction, inferences, stereotypes
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THE ROLE of language in transmitting stereo-
types and in preserving them in front of
disconfirming evidence has been the object of
investigation in many recent studies (for
overviews see Bourhis & Maass, in press; Maass,
1999; Wigboldus, Spears, & Semin, 1999). One
aspect that is of particular relevance to the
present series of experiments is the level of
abstraction at which stereotypic or counter-
stereotypic events are communicated. Events
that correspond to stereotypic expectations
tend to be communicated in a relatively abstract
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see Semin & Fiedler’s, 1988, Linguistic Category
Model), whereas unexpected events tend to be
communicated in more concrete language, a
phenomenon generally referred to as the
Linguistic Expectancy Bias (see Wigboldus,
Semin, & Spears, 2000). Since abstract language
implies greater temporal stability, greater
cross-situational generality, and is overall more
telling about the protagonist, the Linguistic
Expectancy Bias may contribute in a subtle but
significant way to the perpetuation of stereo-
types. Indeed, research by Douglas and Sutton
(2003) convincingly shows that people use
abstract language when they want to convey that
an act is typical of the protagonist.
In the present line of research, we want to
extend this general idea to memory distortions.
Whereas the research reported above deals
mainly with language use, we are asking here
whether a similar phenomenon may emerge
when people memorize events that are consist-
ent or inconsistent with their stereotypic
expectancies. In other words, will people inad-
vertently distort their memories by transforming
concrete information into abstract representa-
tions? Will they do so mainly when they




There is strong evidence that people sponta-
neously infer traits from concrete behavioral
information, or, linguistically speaking, that
they transform verbs into adjectives. The most
convincing evidence for this idea comes from
an extensive research project by Uleman and
collaborators, showing that such inferences
require no intention or explicit instruction and
often occur without awareness (Uleman, 1987;
Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996;
Uleman & Moscowitz, 1994; Uleman, Newman,
& Winter, 1986; Uleman, Winborne, Winter, &
Shechter, 1986; Winter & Uleman, 1984;
Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985; see also
Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Carlston,
Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995; Van Overwalle,
Drenth, & Marsman, 1999). Much less clear,
and rarely investigated, is the opposite infer-
ence from traits to behaviors (see Wyer &
Lambert, 1994). A closer look at the literature
reveals a striking imbalance in social psycho-
logical research, with great emphasis on induc-
tive inferences (from behaviors to traits) and
an almost complete absence of research on
deductive inferences (from traits to behaviors,
see Beike & Sherman, 1994, for an overview).
In an attempt to investigate the comple-
mentary inference processes within a single
paradigm, Maass, Colombo, Colombo, and
Sherman (2001) have conducted two studies
testing the hypothesis that inductive inferences
occur more frequently and more spontaneously
than deductive inferences. Participants received
descriptions of a target person, half of which
presented in trait form (adjectives), half in
behavior form (verbs). A subsequent recog-
nition task was constructed in such a way that
some of the items (traits and behaviors) had
actually been seen, some were entirely new, and
some were new but had been implied by the
information given (traits implied by behaviors
or behaviors implied by traits). Results show
that participants frequently misidentified traits
as already seen if they had been implied by a
behavior, suggesting that they had made spon-
taneous inductive inferences, whereas the
opposite type of error was very rare. Inductive
inferences from behaviors to traits were about
four times as frequent as inferences from traits
to behaviors. Assuming that these systematic
memory distortions reflect implicit inferences,
this phenomenon was labeled Induction–
Deduction Asymmetry (IDA). An additional
response time measure (Maass et al., 2001,
Experiment 2) suggested that traits were
inferred from behaviors during encoding in an
online fashion (and, hence, inferred traits were
stored in memory along with actually learned
traits) whereas inferred behaviors had to be
‘reconstructed’ in a memory-based fashion
during retrieval.
Subsequent research confirmed that IDA
emerges both on recognition and free recall
tasks and that asymmetrical memory confusions
occur even when adjectives and verbs share
the same word stem (e.g. aggress-aggressive,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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dominate-dominant, see Maass, Cadinu, Taroni, &
Masserini, 2004). Importantly, the asymmetry is
linked to person perception but does not occur
when the same verb and adjective information
is presented as a simple wordlist, that is, without
reference to a specific target person (Maass
et al., 2004, Experiment 4).
Taken together, these results confirm what
has previously been shown by Uleman and
others, namely that inductive inferences occur
spontaneously and largely without awareness
(cf. Uleman, 1987; Carlston & Skowronski,
1994; Van Overwalle et al., 1999). At the same
time they extend previous work in important
ways: They show that there is an asymmetry in
inferential processing such that the inverse
inference from trait to behavior is not only com-
parably rare but also occurs at a later stage in
information processing. Presumably, deductive
processes fail to occur unless they are triggered
by an explicit request or by the need to predict
behaviors in specific situations; in contrast,
inductive inferences seem to be wired into
social information processing and to occur by
default during encoding. This is in line with the
idea advanced by various authors that there is a
general tendency toward abstraction in social
information processing and interpersonal com-
munication such that people tend to move from
the concrete to the abstract, unless problems
arise that force them to return to a more spe-
cific level of analysis (Fiedler, Semin, & Bolten,
1989; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Semin & Fiedler,
1988; Semin & Smith, 1999; for a similar argu-
ment in cognitive psychology, see also Posner &
Keele, 1968, 1970; Strange, Keeney, Kessel, &
Jenkins, 1970).
IDA and stereotypes
The main question addressed in the present
research concerns the potentially moderating
effect of stereotypic expectancies. Maass et al.
(2001) have argued that the relative strength of
inductive vs. deductive inferences may vary
across situations. The hypothesis investigated
here is that the mental transformation of
verbs into adjectives may be facilitated when-
ever the behavior corresponds to stereotypic
expectancies, but inhibited when the behavior
contradicts such expectancies. To the contrary,
deductive inferences should be largely un-
affected by stereotypic expectancies.
Why should this be the case? From a semantic
network perspective, there is reason to believe
that stereotypes associate social groups more
with traits than with behaviors. We assume that,
in people’s minds, social groups are more
strongly associated with traits considered typical
of those particular groups than with behaviors.
In support of this idea, previous research has
shown that stereotypes tend to take the form of
abstract trait expectations such as ‘Women are
sensitive’ or ‘Men are dominant’. For example,
Maass, Montalcini, and Biciotti (1998) asked
research participants to generate a list of
characteristics that they thought were typical of
different social groups ( Jews, Italians, Ger-
mans). Despite the fact that participants had
explicitly been told that they could either use
phrases (hence verbs) or adjectives, adjectives
clearly prevailed over any other linguistic form.
Interestingly, stereotype researchers tend to
share this view. Many researchers define stereo-
types as group-trait associations. For example,
Brehm and Kassin (1996) define stereotypes as
‘beliefs that associate groups of people with certain
traits’ (p. 122). The same predominance of trait
adjectives is also reflected in the measurement
tools typically employed by stereotype
researchers; again, traits tend to outnumber
behavioral items regardless of whether the
focus is on explicit (Katz & Braly, 1933) or
implicit measures (Devine, 1989; Perdue,
Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990; Hamilton &
Rose, 1980; Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll,
Hermsen, & Russin, 2000). Thus, researchers
and lay persons alike tend to think of stereo-
types as typical traits rather than as typical
behaviors.
If social categories (e.g. men) are more
strongly associated with typical traits (e.g. domi-
nant) than with typical behaviors (e.g. imposing
one’s opinions), then any reference to the social
category should mainly activate related traits.
Thinking about a social category will render rel-
evant trait information particularly accessible
(Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994) and, hence,
Maass et al. converting verbs into adjectives
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facilitate inferences from behaviors to such
highly accessible traits. Therefore, people who
encounter information about a group member
(e.g. a man), together with a behavior (imposes
his opinions), are likely to spontaneously infer
the corresponding trait (dominant) for the
simple reason that the trait has become highly
accessible as a function of the category activa-
tion. When traits are incongruent with the
social group (e.g. men—submissive), however,
inhibitory processes are likely to come into play
that reduce the accessibility of stereotypic
knowledge (see Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne,
& Castelli, 1999); hence, inferences from behav-
iors to such incongruent traits may be inhib-
ited. Taken together, we suggest that stereotypic
expectancies will affect inductive processes by
facilitating stereotype-congruent trait infer-
ences and, at the same time, inhibiting incon-
gruent trait inferences. In contrast, stereotypic
expectancies should exert little or no influence
on deductive inferences from traits to behaviors
because social group labels have weaker links to
behavioral information. Thus, due to differ-
ences in associative strength, trait inferences
should be facilitated whenever stereotype-
congruent behaviors are encountered (but
inhibited when stereotype-incongruent infor-
mation is provided) while deductive inferences
should be largely unaffected by stereotypic
expectancies. 
To our knowledge, the only published
research investigating the effect of stereotypes
on inductive and deductive inferences is
Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, and van Knippenberg’s
(2003) recent work. In five studies, these
authors have investigated the hypothesis that
spontaneous trait inferences are facilitated
when behavioral information is stereotype-
consistent but obstructed when it is inconsis-
tent. In their paradigm, participants read
sentences about a target person that were either
presented in the form of trait-adjectives or in
the form of behavior-descriptive verbs and that
were either stereotype consistent or inconsis-
tent. Each description was followed by a rele-
vant trait or behavior probe. For example, the
participant may have read the phrase ‘The skin-
head hit the saleswoman’ and was subsequently
asked to indicate whether the word ‘aggressive’
had been part of the sentence. The argument of
the authors is that, if participants had drawn
spontaneous trait inferences while reading the
first phrase, it should take them longer to reject
the implied trait (aggressive) that was not con-
tained in the phrase but implied by the infor-
mation given. If people make trait inferences
from stereotype-consistent but not from incon-
sistent behavioral information, then reaction
times should be much longer in the former
than in the latter case. This is exactly what was
found: it took participants much longer to
reject a trait implied by the previous behavior
information when the information was congru-
ent rather than incongruent with stereotypic
expectancies. Stereotype congruence did not
affect the opposite type of inference (from
traits to behaviors—Study 1), suggesting that
stereotypes affect inductive but not deductive
inferences. Another important finding is that,
compared to a stereotype-neutral condition,
inferences are inhibited by stereotype incon-
gruence, but they are not reliably facilitated by
stereotype congruence (Study 3). Together,
these findings suggest that people spon-
taneously draw inductive inferences, from
behaviors to traits, but that this process can be
inhibited when the behavioral information is
incongruent with stereotypic expectations.
Goal of the present experiment
The predictions of our own studies reported
here are much in line with Wigboldus et al.’s
(2003) findings, but contrary to their research
we are focusing on memory distortions. The
recognition probe paradigm used by Wigboldus
et al. provides an excellent tool for investigating
spontaneous inferences, but it is not concerned
with memory errors. Not only are errors very
rare in the recognition probe paradigm, but,
when they occur, they are excluded from the
reaction time analyses. In contrast, memory dis-
tortions are the main focus of our studies as
they represent particularly relevant long-term
effects of asymmetrical inferences. Also, con-
trary to Wigboldus et al.’s research, we investi-
gated inductive and deductive inferences in a
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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single paradigm which allows us to show directly
the asymmetrical status of inductive and deduc-
tive inferences. Third, unlike Wigboldus et al.,
in the present study we wished to show how
individual differences, that is, the level of Need
for Cognitive Closure, moderate the pattern of
asymmetrical inferences, predicting that indi-
viduals with a high level of Need for Closure
should be particularly sensitive to the stereo-
type congruency of the presented information.
In the present research we investigated infer-
ences in a simulated case of personnel selec-
tion. Personnel selection is one of many applied
situations in which asymmetrical inference pro-
cesses may play a role. A comparative evaluation
of applicants generally requires an integration
of a wide variety of sources including objective
test results, the candidate’s self-presentation
during interviewing, and the description of the
candidate by others in reference letters and the
like. The information provided may in part con-
sist of very concrete, behavioral information, in
part of rather abstract statements about the
personality, potentials, enduring behavioral
tendencies and habits of the applicant. An
interesting applied question is therefore how
evaluators may integrate various pieces of infor-
mation. IDA suggests that they are likely to
spontaneously and unintentionally translate
concrete behavioral information into trait rep-
resentations while it is unlikely that they will
translate abstract trait information into con-
crete behavioral instances. Also, if the above
reasoning is correct, trait inferences should
mainly occur for information that corresponds
to the stereotypical expectations of the
person(s) involved in the selection process.
This hypothesis was tested in a simulated case
of personnel selection in which a recommen-
dation letter provided information either in
the form of behavioral or trait information.
Research participants read the information
contained in the recommendation letter
allegedly written by a former employer and
were subsequently tested for their memory of
the content of the letter. The first question
was whether participants would erroneously
remember behavioral (verb) information as
traits (adjectives) but not vice versa.
More importantly, we were interested to see
whether stereotype congruence would moder-
ate this effect in ways similar to those found by
Wigboldus et al. (2003). Therefore, the gender
of the applicant was varied systematically
together with the stereotypicality of the infor-
mation so that the characteristics described in
the letter either corresponded or did not corre-
spond to those typically associated with women
or men. In other words, both male and female
applicants were either described in typically
masculine or in typically feminine terms. We
predicted a facilitation of inductive inferences
when the applicant was described in stereotype-
congruent terms, but an inhibition of such
inferences when the description was incongru-
ent with the applicant’s gender. We expected
deductive inferences to be unaffected by stereo-
typic expectancies.
Cognitive closure
As mentioned above, an additional goal of the
present series of studies was to test whether
Need for Cognitive Closure (Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994) would moderate the ten-
dency to make spontaneous behavior-to-trait
inferences, especially when the behavior coin-
cided with stereotypic expectancies. There is
evidence that people with high need for closure
prefer abstract descriptions to specific ones. For
example, Boudreau, Baron, and Oliver (1992)
found that an enhanced need for structure was
associated with increasing use of global trait
labels when describing others. Along the same
line, Mikulincer, Yinon, and Kabili (1991)
found an increase of global and stable self-
attributions after failure experiences as a func-
tion of need for structure. These findings
suggest that people with a high need for closure
may quickly translate behavioral data into trait
representations, possibly because traits reduce
the complexity of behavioral information and
create order and coherence. However, Maass
et al. (2001) found only partial support for
this prediction in one of their studies and no
support in the other. Thus, there is very little
evidence that people with greater Need for
Cognitive Closure would make more inductive
inferences. This failure may be attributable to
Maass et al. converting verbs into adjectives
275
06 Maass (bc-s)  27/6/05  1:51 pm  Page 275
the fact that the behavioral information pre-
sented in Maass et al.’s study may not have been
congruent with participants’ expectations.
Indeed, a study by Webster, Kruglanski, and Pat-
tison (1997) has shown an increase in linguistic
abstraction as a function of increasing need for
closure only in those situations in which the
observed behavior corresponded to expec-
tations. One may therefore hypothesize that
individuals with a high need for closure will be
more likely to draw spontaneous behavior-to-
trait inferences, but only when behaviors are
congruent with their expectancies. On the con-
trary, they may be unlikely to draw inferences
when the behavioral information contradicts
their expectancies. This possibility was investi-
gated in the present study, hypothesizing that,
with increasing Need for Cognitive Closure,
people may become more prone to draw trait
inferences from stereotype-congruent behav-
iors, but also more reluctant to draw inferences
from incongruent behaviors.
Overview of experimental design
Taken together, the main goals of the present
study were to (a) replicate IDA in a hypothetical
applied setting, namely personnel selection, (b)
to test the moderating function of stereotypic
expectancies, and (c) to investigate the joint
influence of Need for Cognitive Closure and
stereotype congruency. In order to investigate
these issues, fictitious job applications were
shown to research participants that included a
photograph of the applicant together with a
recommendation letter from a previous
employer. The photograph depicted either a
male or a female applicant and the description
of the applicant consisted in part of gender-
neutral information, in part of information that
was either typical of males or typical of females.
Thus, half of the participants received a recom-
mendation letter that described the applicant
in gender-role congruent terms (masculine
male or feminine female), whereas the other
half received a gender-role incongruent
description (feminine male or masculine
female). Across conditions, half of the descrip-
tions in the letter were provided in behavioral
terms, half in trait terms. Subsequently, the
participants’ task was to recognize the infor-
mation provided in the letter from a list of items
consisting of the actually seen behaviors or
traits as well as implied behaviors or traits along
with entirely new items.
Hypotheses
First, we predicted that participants would
make more inferences from behaviors to traits
than vice versa, resulting in a greater number of
false alarms for traits that had been implied by a
behavior than vice versa.
Second, if behaviors are transformed into
traits in the mind of our participants, then they
should also be less able to correctly recognize
actually seen behaviors than actually seen traits,
resulting in lower hit rates for behaviors than
for traits.
Third, concerning stereotype congruence, it was
predicted that behavior-to-trait inferences
would be (a) more frequent for stereotype-
congruent than for gender-neutral information
but (b) less frequent for stereotype-incongruent
than for gender-neutral information. Thus,
typically feminine descriptions of female appli-
cants and typically masculine descriptions of
male applicants should induce greater induc-
tive inferences than stereotype-incongruent
descriptions with gender-neutral descriptions
occupying an intermediate position. Deductive
inferences were not expected to be affected by
stereotype congruence.
Fourth, it was predicted that, with increasing
Need for Cognitive Closure, participants would be
more likely to infer traits from stereotype-
congruent behaviors but less likely to infer traits
from stereotype-incongruent behaviors. No
relation between Need for Cognitive Closure
and trait inferences were expected for gender-
neutral behaviors, nor did we expect a relation




The experiment consisted of a 2 (participant
gender)  2 (applicant gender)  2 (gender-
relevance: gender-neutral vs. gender-relevant
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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information)  2 (stereotype congruence of
gender-relevant information: congruent vs.
incongruent)  2 (trait vs. behavior presen-
tation during recognition) design in which the
last two factors were within-participant variables.
Participants A total of 280 participants (140
males and 140 females), living in Northern and
Central Italy volunteered for the study. The
mean age was 29.94 years. The majority were
university students while the remaining partici-
pants were employed. The educational level was
relatively high with 83 holding a university
degree, 195 a high school diploma, and only 43
holding diplomas below high school level.
Procedure Participants were told that the
research investigated ‘how people use information
provided in a letter of recommendation in order to
evaluate a hypothetical applicant for a high level job ’.
The first part of the questionnaire consisted of
the letter of recommendation supposedly
written by a previous employer in support of an
applicant applying for a high level job (level 8
in the Italian employment system). Participants
were encouraged to read the letter as often as
they wished in order to form an impression of
the applicant. The reference letter was accom-
panied by a close-up photograph that allowed
us to manipulate gender in addition to other
variables (physical attractiveness and clothing
that had absolutely no effect and that, for rea-
sons of space, will not be reported here). After
reading the letter, participants were asked to
respond to the Italian version of the Need for
Cognitive Closure Scale (Pierro et al., 1995).
Subsequently, participants engaged in a recog-
nition task in which they were asked to tick the
information that they had read, in the exact
same form, in the letter. Finally, after having
viewed the picture of the candidate for a second
time, participants were asked to express a judg-
ment about the suitability of the applicant for
the job. At the end of the experiment, partici-
pants were informed about the purpose of the
experiment.
Applicant gender Half of the applicants were
young males, half young females. On the basis
of a pretest, photos had been matched for
physical attractiveness (2.3 for females and 2.3
for males, on a 5-point scale).
Stimulus material
Each candidate was described in the recom-
mendation letter by 12 pieces of information.
Six characteristics described in the letter
were gender-neutral, the remaining six were
(depending on the condition) either typically
feminine or typically masculine. Obviously, in
the case of a male candidate, the candidate
appeared stereotype-congruent when described
as having a typically masculine personality, but
incongruent when described in feminine terms.
The opposite was true for female candidates. In
each case (neutral, feminine, or masculine
characteristics), four traits were positive and
two negative. Importantly, half of the infor-
mation contained in each letter was provided in
trait form, half in behavior form, so that each
participant received six behaviors and six traits.
For example, one participant may have received
dominance information in trait form (e.g. is
dominant) and athletic ability information in
behavior form (e.g. practices sports), whereas
another may have received dominance infor-
mation in behavior form (e.g. expects to be obeyed)
and athletic ability information in trait form
(e.g. is athletic).
The experimental material was developed in a
step-wise pretesting procedure. Initially, mascu-
line and feminine characteristics were selected
from the Italian version of the Bem Gender Role
Inventory (De Leo & Villa, 1986) and gender-
neutral characteristics were in part taken from
the social desirability scale of the same question-
naire, in part generated by the authors and
pretested for gender-independence. Since the
present study required that characteristics be
uncorrelated, all characteristics (masculine,
feminine, and neutral) were pretested by asking
participants to judge the degree to which one
trait would be diagnostic of other traits (e.g. if a
person A is independent, what is the likelihood
that s/he is also educated, sociable, charismatic,
etc.). Different combinations of 12  12
matrices were judged by a total of 120 partici-
pants.1 Based on this pretest, positively as well
Maass et al. converting verbs into adjectives
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as negatively correlated traits were excluded,
leaving only those traits that were considered
uninformative of the remaining traits.2 Based
on this selection criterion, the following traits
were included in the final material: aggressive,
dominant, analytical, athletic, courageous, authorita-
tive as typically masculine traits; timid, ingenuous,
loyal, intuitive, diplomatic and cheerful as typically
feminine traits; and messy, pessimistic, concrete,
dynamic, up-to-date, and precise as gender-neutral
traits.
Importantly, our design was such that half of
the neutral and half of the gender-typed infor-
mation was presented in trait form, half in
behavior form. This required that for each
selected trait there would be a matching behav-
ior that was diagnostic of that particular trait
without being diagnostic of any of the remaining
traits.
In order to satisfy these criteria, three behav-
ioral descriptions were generated for each trait
that was considered diagnostic for the respec-
tive trait by two independent raters. The mater-
ial was subsequently subjected to a pretest in
which 64 participants had to judge the diagnos-
ticity of each behavior for all traits on a 5-point
scale (from 1 = not at all characteristic to 5 = very
characteristic of a person having trait ‘x’). Behav-
iors were considered acceptable only if they had
been judged highly diagnostic of the target trait
(lowest diagnosticity = 4.1, mean diagnosticity =
4.8 on a 5-point scale) and at the same time
not diagnostic of the remaining traits (mean
difference between target trait and closest sub-
sequent trait = 1.8). Following this procedure,
one behavior was selected for each trait (for
example, dominant—expects to be obeyed; pessimistic
—tends to make negative predictions; for a com-
plete list of stimulus material, see appendix).
This procedure, however, was asymmetrical
since it only tested the diagnosticity of each
behavior for the respective traits but not vice
versa. In order to assure that traits were as
diagnostic of behaviors as behaviors were of
traits, an additional pretest was conducted
(n = 38). Half of the participants rated the
diagnosticity of each behavior for all traits
(Person A did behavior. How likely is it that s/he
will have the following traits) whereas the
remaining half rated the diagnosticity of traits
for all behavior (Person A is trait. How likely is it
that s/he will show the following behaviors).
The rating was provided on a scale from –2
(indicating that the person will not have trait
x/show behavior x) to +2 (indicating that the
person will have trait x/show behavior x), with
0 indicating that the trait/behavior provides no
information about the target behaviors/trait.
Ideally, values should be high and positive
(close to +2) for the target and 0 for the
non-target stimuli. A 2 (trait vs. behavior)  2
(diagnosticity for target trait or behavior vs.
diagnosticity for non-targets) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) revealed a very strong effect for
target vs. non target (F(1, 34) = 953.76, p <
.001). Both traits and behaviors were highly
diagnostic of their respective target (behaviors:
M = 1.80; traits: M = 1.77), but they were close to
zero and, hence, non-diagnostic for the non-
target traits or behaviors (behaviors: M = .17;
traits: M = .12). More importantly, traits were
just as diagnostic of behaviors as behaviors were
diagnostic of traits and no interaction emerged
between the two variables (both Fs < 1). Thus, it
is quite evident that the material was balanced
with respect to behavior-to-trait and trait-to-
behavior diagnosticity.
A final pretest investigated the possibility that
traits and behaviors may differ with respect to
the ease to which they can be memorized—
independently of inferential processes (for
example, due to differential vividness). It was
therefore important to assure that—in the
absence of inferential processes—traits and
behaviors included in the study would have a
similar likelihood of being remembered. We
therefore had research participants (n = 30)
read either a list of the 18 traits (analytical,
athletic, etc.) or a list of the 18 behaviors (to rely
on logic when evaluating situations, to practice
sports, etc.), this time not referring to any
specific person and under explicit memory
instructions. In both cases one additional item
(trait or behavior) was added at the beginning
and one at the end of the list to reduce chances
of primacy and recency effects. After one hour,
participants were asked to recognize the previ-
ously seen stimuli from a new list containing all
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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the old traits (or behaviors) and six distracter
traits (or behaviors). Correct recognition was
quite similar and not significantly different for
the trait list (M = 9.71) and the behavior list (M
= 10.29), suggesting that neither stimulus type
had an a priori memory advantage.
The above material allowed us to manipulate
three independent variables of our factorial
design, namely gender-relevance vs. irrele-
vance, masculinity vs. femininity of gender-
relevant information, and trait vs. behavior
representation.
Gender-relevance The first variable was
gender-relevance, manipulated within partici-
pants. Each participant read a recommendation
letter in which the applicant was described by
six gender-neutral statements (two negative and
four positive) and by six gender-relevant state-
ments (either all stereotypically masculine or all
stereotypically feminine, again including two
negative behaviors and four positive behaviors).
Stereotype congruency of gender-relevant
information: congruent vs. incongruent The
second factor, manipulated between partici-
pants, was masculinity vs. femininity of the
gender-relevant information. Half of the par-
ticipants received a letter in which all gender-
relevant information was typically masculine,
whereas for the other half it was all feminine.
Thus, the gender-relevant information pro-
vided in the letter was either stereotype-congru-
ent or incongruent with the gender of
applicant.
Trait vs. behavior representation The last
factor, manipulated within participants, was the
trait vs. behavior representation of the infor-
mation. Half of the gender-neutral and half of
the gender-relevant information were pre-
sented in trait form, half in behavior form. For
example, in the case of gender-neutral infor-
mation, each participant received one of the
two negative and two of the four positive pieces
of information in trait form, the other in behav-
ior form. Trait vs. behavior presentation was
counterbalanced across two versions to which
participants had been randomly assigned. We
had prepared two versions of each recommen-
dation letter so that the same information (e.g.
dominance) appeared in trait form (e.g. domi-
nant) in one version and in behavior form
(expects to be obeyed ) in the other version.
Also, a standard introduction (I am writing on
behalf of . . . ) and ending (I would be happy to pro-
vide any additional information . . . ) was added to
the recommendation letter in order to enhance
its credibility. For the same reason, the different
pieces of information were integrated into a
coherent text by the use of transition adverbs
and the like (at the same time . . . , despite this
fact . . .).
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale After having
read the letter at their own pace, participants
were asked to complete the Need for Cognitive
Closure Scale. This scale, originally developed
by Webster and Kruglanski (1994) assesses the
tendency to reach cognitive closure. The Italian
version by Pierro et al. (1995) used in this
research consists of 42 items assessing the desire
for predictability, preference for order and
structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisive-
ness, and close-mindedness (item examples:
‘Usually I take important decisions quickly and with
certainty’, ‘I don’t like to be in situations without
knowing what to expect’). Participants indicated
their agreement on a 4-point scale (from ‘com-
pletely false’ to ‘completely true’). Cronbach’s alpha
of the entire scale was .98, with alphas for sub-
scales ranging from .85 to .97.
Dependent variables
Recognition The main dependent variable
consisted of a recognition measure in which
participants were presented with a list of trait
adjectives and behaviors and asked to tick those
terms that they had read in the exact same formu-
lation in the reference letter. The recognition
measure included a list of 18 characteristics,
including 12 old and 6 new characteristics,
which were presented in random order. The old
items were all those characteristics that had
been presented in the reference letter, includ-
ing 6 gender-neutral and 6 gender-relevant
items (depending on the condition, either all
masculine or all feminine). The new items (2 of
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negative and 4 of positive valence) were all
unrelated to gender stereotyping. Importantly,
each characteristic was presented in trait and in
behavior form. Thus, 18 item pairs were pre-
sented as illustrated in this example: 
dominant expects to be obeyed
believes anybody out of  ingenuous 
inexperience
The order of trait and behavior representa-
tion within each pair was counterbalanced, as
was the order of the 18 item pairs. Participants
were explicitly told that they could tick either
the first or the second alternative of each pair,
or neither or both. In reality, this last option was
practically absent among the responses (n = 4).3
The recognition measure allowed us to ana-
lyze not only the number of correctly recog-
nized traits and behaviors (hits) and false
alarms (new items), but, more importantly, the
number of inferences from traits to behaviors
and vice versa. Thus, if a characteristic had orig-
inally been presented in the form of a behavior
(e.g. examines every situation in detail), but
recalled as a trait adjective (precise), it was scored
as a behavior-to-trait inference. Responses were
scored as trait-to-behavior inferences when the
participant incorrectly ticked a behavior (e.g.
examines every situation in detail) that had origi-
nally been presented as trait (precise).
Suitability The second dependent variable
was the subjective suitability of the candidate
for the job. Participants were asked to rate on a
4-point scale from 1 = not at all suitable to 4 = very
suitable the degree to which they thought the
candidate was suitable for the high level job.
Results
The recognition task provided three measures
of interest: (a) the number of hits indicative of
the participant’s ability to correctly recognize
the information s/he had read in the reference
letter, (b) the number of inferences, that is false
alarms for old items indicative of inferences
from traits to behaviors or vice versa and (c) the
number of false alarms for entirely new items.
(Considering the large sample size, we decided
to correct for inflated  by setting the probabil-
ity level to p < .01.)
Hits 
A 2 (participant gender)  2 (applicant
gender)  2 (gender-relevance: gender-neutral
vs. gender-relevant information)  2 (stereo-
type congruence of gender-relevant infor-
mation: stereotype-congruent vs. incongruent)
 2 (trait vs. behavior presentation during
recognition) ANOVA with repeated measures
on the third and last variables was conducted
for hits. Values could vary from a minimum of 
0 to a maximum of 3 in each trait/behavior 
gender-relevance combination. In line with
Hypothesis 2, traits (M = 2.18) were correctly
recognized with greater frequency than behav-
iors (M = 1.30) (F(1, 272) = 162.58, p < .001, 2
= .37). Also, gender-relevant information (M =
1.81) was recognized more frequently than
gender-neutral information (M = 1.68) (F(1,
272) = 8.68, p < .001, 2 = .03), but this was only
true for stereotype-incongruent information.
Indeed, a reliable interaction between stereo-
type congruence and gender-relevance (F(1,
272) = 14.88, p < .001, 2 = .05) revealed that
stereotype-incongruent information (M = 2.00)
was better remembered than either stereotype-
congruent (M = 1.62) or gender-neutral infor-
mation (M = 1.66 if presented together with
stereotype-congruent and M = 1.70 if presented
together with stereotype-incongruent infor-
mation) (all ts > 3.5, p < .01), whereas no
differences emerged between the remaining
three conditions. Together, these data indicate
a memory advantage for information (both
behaviors and traits) that is incongruent with
stereotypic expectancies. More importantly, in
line with our second hypothesis, they suggest
that, compared to traits, recognition of behav-
iors is poorer presumably because behaviors
have been transformed into trait representation.
Inferences 
Of greater theoretical interest are the false
alarm rates for items that had not been seen but
that had been implied by the information
given. We had predicted two effects for this
measure: In line with IDA, a main effect was
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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predicted for type of inference such that
behavior-to-trait inferences would outnumber
trait-to-behavior inferences (Hypothesis 1). We
had also predicted a three-way interaction
between stereotype congruence, gender-
relevance, and type of inference, such that the
greatest asymmetry would be observed for items
that were relevant to and stereotypically congru-
ent with the applicant’s gender.
The 2 (participant gender)  2 (applicant
gender)  2 (gender-relevance: gender-neutral
vs. gender-relevant information)  2 (stereo-
type congruence of relevant information: con-
gruent vs. incongruent)  2 (type of inference:
behavior-to-trait vs. trait-to-behavior) ANOVA
for inferences confirmed both predictions. In
line with Hypothesis 1, a very strong main effect
emerged for type of inference, indicating that
participants were more likely to falsely recog-
nize a trait adjective that had been implied by a
behavior (M = 1.58) than vice versa (M = .75)
(F(1, 272) = 164.35, p < .001, 2 = .38).
Moreover, inferences were somewhat more
frequent for gender-neutral (M = 1.23) than for
gender-relevant information (M = 1.23) (F(1,
272) = 8.12, p < .01, 2 = .03). Also, more infer-
ences were drawn in the condition in which the
gender-relevant information was congruent (M
= 1.28) rather than incongruent (M = 1.05) with
gender stereotypes (F(1, 272) = 12.91, p < .001,
2 = .05). But the above main effects were
specified by an interaction between gender-
relevance and stereotype congruence (F(1,
272) = 19.11, p < .001, 2 = .07). Inferences
(including both inductive and deductive
inferences) were more likely to occur for stereo-
type-congruent (M = 1.32) than for stereotype-
incongruent information (M = .90) (t(272) =
4.94, p < .01). In contrast, the tendency to draw
inferences from gender-neutral information
was the same regardless of whether the neutral
information occurred together with stereotypi-
cal (M = 1.25) or together with counterstereo-
typical information (M = 1.21). This is not
surprising considering that the gender-neutral
information was exactly the same in the two con-
ditions (stereotype-congruent or incongruent).
Most importantly and in line with Hypothe-
sis 3, the above interaction was specified by a
significant three-way interaction between
gender-relevance, stereotype congruence, and
type of inference (F(1, 272) = 9.01, p < .01, 2 =
.03) (see Table 1). Although behavior-to-trait
inferences greatly outnumbered trait-to-behavior
inferences in all experimental conditions, the
two types of inferences were differentially
affected by relevance and stereotype congru-
ence. Deductive (trait-to-behavior) inferences
did not vary as a function of either relevance or
stereotype congruence. In contrast, inductive
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Table 1. Mean number of behavior-to-trait and trait-to-behavior inferences as a function 
of gender-relevance and stereotypicality of information
Behavior-to-trait inferences Trait-to-behavior inferences
Stereotype- Stereotype- Stereotype- Stereotype-
congruent incongruent congruent incongruent
Gender-relevant 1.87a 1.27b .76d .53d
n = 140 n = 140 n = 140 n = 140
Gender-neutral 1.55c 1.65c .95d .77d
n = 140 n = 140 n = 140 n = 140
Notes: Means with different subscripts differ significantly from each other (p < .01). Behavior-to-trait 
inferences refer to false alarms of trait stimuli that had been implied by a behavior, trait-to-behavior
inferences to false alarms of behavior stimuli that had been implied by a trait. Gender-relevance represents a 
within-participant factor, with all participants receiving both gender-relevant and irrelevant information.
Stereotype congruence represents a between-participants factor so that the gender-relevant information was
either congruent or incongruent with gender stereotypes. The gender-neutral information was kept constant
across the congruent and incongruent conditions.
06 Maass (bc-s)  27/6/05  1:51 pm  Page 281
(behavior-to-trait) inferences occurred much
more frequently when the behavior matched
stereotypic expectancies (M = 1.87) than when
it was counterstereotypical (M = 1.27), with
inferences for gender-neutral information
occupying an intermediate position. Indeed,
inferences from stereotype-congruent behav-
iors to corresponding traits (M = 1.84) were sig-
nificantly more likely than inferences from
gender-neutral behaviors (M = 1.55, reported
together with stereotype-congruent infor-
mation), whereas inferences from stereotype-
incongruent behaviors (M = 1.27) were less
likely than inferences from gender-neutral
behaviors (M = 1.65, reported together with
stereotype-incongruent information).
A simplified way to represent these data is to
collapse responses to gender-neutral descrip-
tions (which were identical regardless of
whether they occurred together with stereo-
type-congruent or incongruent information)
and to compare them to inferences for stereo-
type-congruent and stereotype-incongruent
descriptions (see Figure 1). As can be seen,
inductive (but not deductive) inferences
decreased in a linear fashion from stereotype-
congruent over gender-neutral to stereotype-
incongruent information.
False alarms for old and new items 
Theoretically, the greater frequency of behav-
ior-to-trait inferences rather than vice versa
could reflect an artifact due to a generalized
tendency to give more false-positive responses
to traits than to behaviors. If this was true, then
false alarm rates should also be greater for new
traits that had not been included in the recom-
mendation letter. To control for this possibility,
we therefore ran a 2 (participant gender)  2
(applicant gender)  2 (stereotype congru-
ence)  2 (trait vs. behavior presentation
during recognition) ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last variable, using the false
alarms for new items as dependent variable.
The analysis revealed absolutely no difference
between false alarms for traits (M = .28) and
false alarms for behaviors (M = .29) (F(1, 272) =
.03, ns, 2 = .00), nor any interaction with





































Figure 1. Inferences for stereotype-congruent, gender-neutral, and stereotype-incongruent information.
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additional variables (all Fs < 1). Hence, the
tendency to erroneously identify implied traits
as already seen seems to reflect an inductive
inference from previously learned behavior
information, and not just a tendency toward
false alarms for just any trait adjective.
Need for cognitive closure
In the fourth hypothesis, we predicted that
the tendency to draw trait inferences from
stereotype-congruent behaviors would be par-
ticularly pronounced for those participants with
a high Need for Cognitive Closure. At the same
time, these participants were expected to be
reluctant to draw inferences from stereotype-
incongruent behaviors. On the other hand,
Need for Cognitive Closure was not expected to
be predictive of inductive inferences for
gender-neutral information nor of deductive
inferences.
In order to test this hypothesis, we ran a series
of regression analyses using either the inductive
(behavior-to-trait) or the deductive (trait-to-
behavior) inferences as the dependent variable
and using Need for Cognitive Closure as the
predictor variable (with all variables z-trans-
formed). This was done separately for gender-
relevant and gender-neutral information and
for stereotype-congruent and incongruent
information.
Looking first at the inductive (behavior-to-
trait) inferences, Need for Cognitive Closure
was not predictive of inferences for gender-
neutral information ( = –.04; F(1,127) = .38,
ns). By contrast, as can be seen in Figure 2, the
greater the Need for Cognitive Closure, the
more likely participants were to draw trait infer-
ences from stereotype-congruent behaviors
( = .34; F(1,138) = 18.35, p < .001), but less
likely to draw such inferences from stereotype-
incongruent behaviors ( = –.25; F(1,138) =
9.15, p < .01). This finding confirms Hypothesis
4, by showing a positive relation between Need
for Cognitive Closure and inductive inferences
for stereotype-congruent, and a negative rela-
tion for stereotype-incongruent behaviors, with
inferences from gender-neutral behaviors being
unrelated to Need for Closure.
Turning to deductive inferences, Need for
Cognitive Closure was unrelated to either
stereotype-congruent or stereotype-incongruent
inferences. For deductive inferences, Need for
Closure emerged only as a negative modest pre-
dictor ( = –.14; F(1,278 = 5.80, p < .05) in the
case of gender-neutral information: the greater
the Need for Cognitive Closure, the fewer the



























Figure 2. Trait inferences from stereotype-congruent, gender-neutral, and stereotype-incongruent behaviors
as a function of Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC).
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trait-to-behavior inferences participants tended
to draw.
Suitability 
An additional measure assessed the degree to
which candidates were judged suitable for the
job. A 2 (participant gender)  2 (applicant
gender)  2 (stereotype congruence of rele-
vant information: congruent vs. incongruent)
ANOVA was performed on the suitability
judgments. The only significant effect emerging
from this analysis was a main effect for stereo-
type congruence (F(1,727) = 8.16, p = .01, 2 =
.03), indicating that candidates that conformed
to stereotypic expectancies, that is masculine
males and feminine females (M = 2.96) were
judged as more suitable for the managerial job
than those that contradicted such expectancies
(M = 2.66). Interestingly, this was equally true
for male and female candidates, as evidenced
by the lack of interaction between applicant
gender and stereotype congruence (F(1,727) =
1.18, ns, 2 = .01).
At this point, one may ask whether behavior-
to-trait inferences, that is, generalizations
beyond the specific behavior, are predictive of
suitability ratings. One may hypothesize that,
the more trait inferences people draw from
stereotype-congruent behaviors, the more suit-
able they may perceive the candidate to be. An
inverse relation may be expected for trait-
inferences from incongruent behaviors: the
fewer inferences that are drawn from such
behaviors, the more suitable the candidate
should appear. In order to test this interactive
function of inferential processes and stereotype
congruence, four separate regression analyses
were run in which inferences (z-transformed)
and stereotype congruence of the description
(dummy-coded) were entered in the first step,
while the interaction was added in the second
step. This was done separately for inductive and
deductive inferences and for gender-relevant
and gender-neutral information. The predicted
interaction between inferences and stereotype
congruence emerged, as an almost significant
tendency, only for inductive inferences and
when the information was relevant to gender
( = .25; t = 1.93, p < .06). The interaction is
represented in Figure 3. When behavior infor-
mation contradicted stereotypic expectancies,
the greater the number of behavior-to-trait
inferences, the lower the suitability of the
candidate ( = –.20; F(1,138) = 4.39, p < .05).
For stereotype-congruent information, there
was a nonsignificant tendency in the opposite
direction such that more trait inferences 
were associated with higher suitability ratings
( = .05, ns).
Discussion
The aim of the present experiment was to test
asymmetrical inference processes in the context
of personnel selection, together with the mod-
erating role of stereotypic expectancies and
Need for Cognitive Closure. Results of the
present experiment are highly supportive of
predictions. First of all, the hypothesized
asymmetry was clearly confirmed. Participants
were much more likely to erroneously identify
an unseen but implied trait (rather than an
unseen but implied behavior) as already seen.
Note that this occurred only for traits that had
been implied by a behavior, but not for entirely
new traits, suggesting that we are not simply
dealing with a biased guessing strategy of the
sort ‘since we generally describe people by traits, it is
more likely that I have seen a trait rather than a
behavior’. Also, behavior-to-trait inferences
occurred despite the explicit instruction to only
identify those items that had been presented
in the letter in the exact same form. Apparently,
our participants unintentionally transformed
behavioral information into trait adjectives; sub-
sequently, they retrieved this information from
memory without being aware that the original
information had been provided in a different,
less general format. This finding is perfectly in
line with previous research suggesting that
inductive inferences occur unintentionally
(Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Carlston et al.,
1995; Uleman, 1987; Uleman & Moscowitz,
1994; Uleman, Newman, & Winter, 1986;
Uleman, Winborne, Winter, & Shechter, 1986;
Uleman et al., 1996; Van Overwalle et al., 1999;
Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter et al., 1985). At
the same time, our study extends previous
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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research by showing, within a unifying experi-
mental paradigm, that this inference process is
asymmetrical.
A curious finding of this research is the fact
that participants encountered considerable dif-
ficulty in recognizing behaviors despite the fact
that behaviors are generally considered more
vivid and hence easier to retrieve. Two different
explanations may be offered for this finding.
First, the experimental material may have been
biased such that behaviors, for some unknown
reason, may have left weaker memory traces
than the more abstract trait descriptions. Our
pretest argues against this interpretation con-
sidering that behaviors and traits led to
comparable recognition rates when presented
separately and out of context. More plausible is
a second explanation according to which the
mental transformation of behaviors into traits
(which is likely to occur spontaneously during
encoding, see Maass et al., 2001, Experiment 2;
Widboldus et al., 2003) may have cancelled the
original information. It is noteworthy in this
context, that our design contained a peculiar
feature that should have rendered recognition
of the originally seen items relatively easy. The
recognition task was structured so that the orig-
inal behavior information was presented together
with the implied trait (side-by-side, either
immediately preceding, or immediately follow-
ing it), and participants were explicitly allowed
to tick both, behavior and trait. Despite this
instruction, none of the 280 research partici-
pants ticked the actually seen behavioral
information together with the inferred trait,
suggesting that the behavioral information was
substituted (rather than complemented) by the
more abstract trait representation. Rather than
storing the episodic behavior information along
with the inferred trait, our participants seem to
have transformed the information in a more
abstract representation without having pre-
served the concrete behavioral information.
This finding is curious as it contradicts some
of the observations on false memories. For
example, Roedinger and McDermott (1995),
using a very different paradigm, found that
implied targets were more likely to be falsely
recognized, the better the memory for the
actually seen information that triggered the
false memory. In Roedinger and McDermott’s
(1995) case, false memories were stored along


















Figure 3. Suitability as a function of trait inferences from stereotype congruent vs. incongruent behaviors.
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with accurate memory traces whereas in our
research false memories seem to have substi-
tuted the original traces. This raises the chal-
lenging question of when false memories will
complement and when they will substitute
accurate memory traces. Only future research
will be able to give a definite answer to this
question.
The second, and probably most important
finding of the present study, is that inductive,
but not deductive inferences are influenced by
stereotypic expectancies. Using gender-neutral
information as a baseline, our results show that
trait inferences were facilitated when the infor-
mation matched the applicant’s gender, but
inhibited when the applicant was described in
ways that contradicted socially shared gender-
stereotypes. In contrast, deductive inferences
did not vary as a function of stereotype congru-
ence. These findings are nicely in line with our
third hypothesis, in which we had predicted that
both facilitative and inhibitory forces would
affect inductive, but not deductive processes.
It is important to point out that the greater
inductive potential of stereotype-congruent
compared to incongruent behaviors is not
attributable to any bias in the experimental
material. Note that the same items (for
example, ‘is able to understand a fact before
reasoning about it’) occurred in the stereotype-
congruent and in the incongruent condition,
since stereotype congruence depended on the
gender of the applicant (what was stereotypical
for male candidates was counterstereotypical
for females, and vice versa). Since gender of
applicant did not interact with any of the
remaining variables, one can conclude that the
greater inductive potential of stereotypic behav-
iors is attributable to the fact that they confirm
gender-role expectations and not to specific
semantic features of the information selected
for this experiment.
Taken together, our findings clearly support
the idea that IDA will occur when evaluating job
applications and that its strength depends on
prior category-based expectancies. The mental
transformation of verbs into adjectives tends to
be facilitated when prior expectancies are con-
firmed but inhibited when they are discon-
firmed. In contrast, deductive inferences are
unrelated to stereotypic expectancies. The fact
that events are falsely recognized (or recalled),
when they are semantically linked to the
information given, is by no means new. False
memories have repeatedly been demonstrated
by both cognitive and social psychologists. What
is new here is the asymmetry of these memory
illusions, depending on whether the original
information is provided in the form of a 
trait-adjective or a behavior-descriptive verb.
Contrary to previous research, our design was
such that the same items served either as
actually seen stimuli or as associated, implied
targets. Such a balanced design allows compara-
tive conclusions about the relative likelihood of
behaviors and traits to create false memories.
What this research shows is a one-sided
tendency to transform episodic behavior infor-
mation into trait information that is not
matched by a complementary deductive infer-
ence process. In a more general sense, this
provides one possible answer to the question of
why some stimuli produce false memories
while others do not—a question that has been
discussed in the literature since the fifties. Our
hypothesis is that false memories may be
facilitated (a) when moving from the concrete
to the abstract, rather than vice versa, and (b)
when information is expectancy-congruent
rather than incongruent.
Another interesting finding of the present
study is that such memory distortions may exert
a direct influence on judgment. Job candidates
in our study were judged more suitable for a
managerial job, the more people tended to
infer traits from stereotype-congruent behav-
iors and the less they inferred traits from incon-
gruent behaviors. In other words, generalizing
beyond the specific behavioral episode may
have positive effects on the evaluation of the
target person if s/he conforms to expectancies,
but generalizations from atypical behaviors
may lead to negative evaluations. Although
additional testing is needed, this suggests that
spontaneous memory distortions may have
important consequences in relevant social
contexts (such as job selection), although the
individual may well be unaware of these biases. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(3)
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An additional aim of our study was to investi-
gate the moderating role of Need for Cognitive
Closure. In line with our hypotheses, the pre-
sent study supported the idea that people with a
high Need for Cognitive Closure, and hence a
strong need for clarity, predictability, and a
strong preference for order and structure,
make more trait inferences when the infor-
mation converges with stereotypic expectancies,
but fewer inferences when the information con-
tradicts such expectancies. Taken together,
these findings are in line with Webster et al.’s
(1997) observation that individuals with a high
need for closure tend to use relatively abstract
language when describing expectancy-congruent
events. The language measure used by Webster
et al. and the memory measure used in the pre-
sent study nicely converge in producing con-
ceptually equivalent results. In both studies,
high need for closure was associated with a shift
toward abstraction (from verbs to adjectives or
from behaviors to traits, respectively) whenever
prior expectancies were confirmed. This sug-
gests that the spontaneous transformation of
behavioral into trait information is reliably
affected by the desire for definite knowledge or
the motivation to avoid ambiguity. It is likely
that such an asymmetrical inference process
contributes to the maintenance of a relatively
stable worldview in people with a high Need for
Cognitive Closure, considering that expectancy-
congruent episodic information is immediately
transformed to a more abstract level, whereas
such a transformation is inhibited when expec-
tations are violated. It may be interesting for
future research to investigate whether tempor-
ary variations in Need for Closure (such as
exposure to noise or time pressure) affect infer-
ential processes in much the same way as stable,
trait-like differences in Need for Closure seem
to impact upon these processes.
Finally, an important question to be investi-
gated in future research is how language bias
in memory is related to language bias in com-
munication. Based on Grice’s principle of co-
operation and, in particular, the maxim of
quality, communication partners are not
expected to say anything they believe to be false.
In the case of the present findings, if a person
has observed, or learned about, a specific
behavior of a target person, s/he will be likely
to remember this behavior in trait (adjective)
form, particularly if the behavior is in line with
socially shared stereotypes. Our study also sug-
gests that the observer will be unaware of this
transformation and may have lost access to the
original (verb) information. Therefore, accord-
ing to the maxim of quality, it appears likely that
our observer will communicate the event to a
third person in the same (abstract) way in
which the information is stored in memory.
Thus, we believe that, in the absence of other
motives, interpersonal communication will
follow the same (asymmetrical) pattern that was
observed in our study. In line with this idea is
the great similarity of many results obtained
with communication and memory measures.
For example, events that correspond to stereo-
typic expectations tend to be communicated in
a relatively abstract language, whereas unex-
pected events tend to be communicated in
more concrete language (see Wigboldus et al.,
2000), matching nicely what has been found for
memory distortions in the present study. Also,
Need for Cognitive Closure appears to affect
language use (Webster et al., 1997) and
memory in very similar ways. Thus, unless
additional motivational processes are operating
(e.g. self-presentation, impression manage-
ment), there is reason to believe that spon-
taneous memory biases such as those observed
here will also affect subsequent interpersonal
discourse. However, the exact link between
memory distortions and communicative biases,
and the conditions under which the two may or
may not concur, can only be investigated in
research employing both memory and com-
munication measures within the same experi-
mental paradigm.
In conclusion, our research suggests that the
unintentional transformation of verb-type infor-
mation into trait-adjective representations in
memory is shaped by stereotypic expectancies,
whereas the inverse memory distortion (from
adjectives to verbs) is not altered. When behav-
ioral information corresponds to stereotypic
expectancies, it is quickly transformed into
traits, whereas such memory distortions are
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inhibited when the behavioral information con-
tradicts such expectancies. This finding nicely
parallels the Linguistic Expectancy Bias (see
Wigboldus et al., 2000). People not only use an
increasingly abstract language the closer events
correspond to their stereotypic expectancies,
but they also show the same tendency toward
abstraction in their own minds, when memoriz-
ing information. In both cases (interpersonal
communication and memory), this shift toward
abstraction is inhibited when behaviors or
events contradict what would be expected on
the basis of shared social stereotypes. This sug-
gests that stereotypes and language abstraction
are intrinsically linked both in intrapsychic pro-
cesses and in interpersonal communication.
Notes
1. Responses were provided on a scale from –2
(extremely unlikely) to +2 (extremely likely), with
‘0’ implying that the trait ‘x’ (e.g. independent)
provided no information about the likelihood of
being also ‘y’ (e.g. sociable).
2. No more than ± .5 from the neutral midpoint.
3. Only in four cases did participants check both
behavior and trait, an insignificant amount
considering the total of 2880 responses given.
Three of the dual responses referred to new 
trait-and-behavior pairs, and one was a deductive
inference case in which the participant had seen
the trait and falsely inferred also having seen the
behavior.
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aggressive gets angry easily
analytical relies on logic when evaluating situations
athletic practices sports
audacious does not fear risky tasks
authoritative exerts power over others
dominant expects to be obeyed
Feminine 
cheerful is of good humor
diplomatic knows to treat delicate issues prudently
ingenuous believes anybody out of inexperience
intuitive is able to understand a fact before reasoning about it
loyal does not attempt to deceive others
timid social relations are embarrassing him/her
Gender-neutral
concrete considers the concrete aspects of the situation
disorganized keeps his/her desk in disorder
dynamic executes his/her tasks with energy
pessimistic tends to make negative predictions
precise examines the different facets of a situation in detail 
up-to-date updates his/her knowledge according to the needs of the organization
* The English translation does not always reflect the exact grammatical form (example: the Italian term for
the composite ‘to get angry’ is ‘arrabbiarsi’, a reflexive verb).
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